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and consistency in the law.
Fara Agrusa
Criminal defendant is per se entitled to vacatur of his conviction
when represented by an attorney whose license is subsequently
revoked
Fundamental to the right to a fair trial under the sixth
amendment is the right of the accused to the assistance of counsel'
at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding.2 This right extends
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defence." Id.; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). "The right of
one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair
trials in some countries, but it is in ours." Id. The Gideon Court recognized the right to
counsel as essential to a fair trial and concluded that the states are required by the four-
teenth amendment to appoint counsel for indigent defendants to ensure that they receive
fair trials. See id. at 341-44. The right of indigent defendants to have counsel appointed for
them was constitutionally recognized for the first time in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
71-72 (1932). See W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.1, at 473 (student ed.
1985). The Powell Court did not focus on the right to counsel under the sixth amendment,
but instead focused on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, stating that
under the circumstances. . . the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the
failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was ... a denial of due
process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. In
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Supreme Court recognized the right of a person
charged with a crime in federal court to the assistance of counsel under the sixth amend-
ment. See id. at 462-63; W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra, § 11.1, at 475. Twenty-five years
later, the right was made obligatory in state criminal prosecutions through operation of the
fourteenth amendment. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342; W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra, § 11.1,
at 476.
2 See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970). The right to counsel attaches "at or
after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment," and is not limited to
the time of trial. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972); see Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964); see also W.
LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 11.1(b), at 484 ("The Sixth Amendment right to ap-
pointed counsel applies only to 'critical stages' in the criminal prosecution ... [where] the
'substantial rights of the accused may be affected' . ...").
Where substantial rights of the accused may be affected by a particular state criminal
procedure or statute governing criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has looked to the law
of that state to determine whether the right to the assistance of counsel has attached under
the sixth amendment. See Meadows v. Kuhhnann, 812 F.2d 72, 76-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 3188 (1987); see, e.g., Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9-10 (sixth amendment right to coun-
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beyond the mere presence of counsel and requires counsel's assis-
tance to be effective.$ Under the New York Constitution,4 the right
to counsel guarantees representation by a licensed attorney. When
sel exists at preliminary hearing granted under state law); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59,
60 (1963) ("Whatever may be the normal function of the 'preliminary hearing' under Mary-
land law, it was in this case as 'critical' a stage as arraignment under Alabama law."); Ham-
ilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1961) (arraignment is "critical stage" in state where
unraised defenses are waived).
3 See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1942); see also Powell, 287 U.S. at
71. In Powell, a capital case involving indigent defendants, the Court recognized that the
"duty [to appoint counsel] is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such
circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the
case." Id. (emphasis added).
The right of a defendant to have competent and effective counsel when pleading guilty
to a felony charge was noted by the Supreme Court in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
770-71 & 771 n.14 (1970). In McMann, the Court stated that "defendants cannot be left to
the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that judges should strive to maintain proper stan-
dards of performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases in
their courts." Id. at 771.
The test to determine whether the assistance of counsel has been "so defective as to
require reversal of a conviction," requires the defendant to demonstrate that counsel's assis-
tance was "deficient" and that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In order to obtain a reversal, the defendant
must establish that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and that "counsel's errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id.
The defendant may be able to demonstrate that the conduct was not professionally reasona-
ble, but unless prejudice to the defendant as a result of the conduct is shown, a reversal will
not be granted. See 2 J. COOK, CONSTrrIUTONAL RIGHTS OF THE AcCUSED § 7:18, at 339
(1986). For an argument rejecting the Strickland prejudice requirement on the ground that
once a defendant establishes that effective assistance of counsel has been denied, he has per
se received an unfair trial and is thereby entitled to a new trial, see Gabriel, The Strickland
Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amend-
ment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. Rav. 1259, 1288-89 (1986).
4 N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 6. "In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel .... Id.
5 See People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287, 291-92, 391 N.E.2d 1274, 1275, 418 N.Y.S.2d 295,
296 (1979). In Felder, the Court of Appeals held that as used in the sixth amendment the
word "counsel is indeed synonymous with attorney at law"; therefore, where a defendant is
represented by an "unlicensed lay person," he has been denied his sixth amendment right to
counsel. Id. at 294, 391 N.E.2d at 1277, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
In dealing with the related issue of the right of a criminal defendant to be represented
by a person of his or her own choosing, courts have held that the right to counsel does not
extend to assistance by one other than a licensed attorney. See 2 J. COOK, supra note 3, §
7:18, at 345. A number of federal courts have rejected claims made by defendants that they
were denied their right to counsel because they were not permitted to be represented by
laypersons. See, e.g., United States v. Wilhelm, 570 F.2d 461, 465 (3d Cir. 1978) (sixth
amendment does not guarantee right to be represented by friend who did not graduate law
school and is not member of bar); United States v. Hinderman, 528 F.2d 100, 103 (8th Cir.
1976) (defendant has right to act as own attorney in criminal trial but does not have consti-
tutional right to be represented by unlicensed attorney); Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407
1988]
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this right has been violated, case law demands the vacatur of a
criminal defendant's conviction without inquiry into whether the
defendant was prejudiced by denial of the right.6 Recently, in Peo-
ple v. Williams,7 the Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Queens
County, applied this per se rule and vacated the conviction of a
defendant represented by an attorney whose license was subse-
quently revoked."
In Williams, defendant Timothy Williams had been repre-
sented by Joel Steinberg in a 1986 criminal prosecution in which
the defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the fourth degree-a class C felony-and was sen-
tenced to five years probation.9 Two years later, while serving time
in a correctional facility for another conviction, the defendant
learned of Steinberg's alleged involvement in a murder and of a
pending investigation into Steinberg's background. 0 The defend-
ant then filed a pro se motion to have his conviction vacated on the
ground that it was obtained in violation of his right to counsel.11
F. Supp. 451, 474 (N.D. Tex., W.D. Pa., N.D. Ind., D. Minn., S.D. Ala., W.D. Wis. 1975)
("counsel" within meaning of sixth amendment not "meant to include a layman off the
street without qualification as to either training or character"), aff'd sub nom. Taylor v.
Montgomery, 539 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Pilla v. American Bar Ass'n, 542
F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976).
8 See Felder, 47 N.Y.2d at 291, 391 N.E.2d at 1275, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 296. The Felder
court rejected application of harmless error analysis to these cases, determining in the lan-
guage of the Supreme Court that "'[t]he right to have the assistance of counsel is too fun-
damental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial.'" Id. at 296, 391 N.E.2d at 1278, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 299
(quoting Glasser, 315 U.S. at 76). Relying on Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the
court in People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 787, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975), had
stated that constitutional errors require reversal of a conviction unless it can be demon-
strated "that there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to
defendant's conviction and that it was thus harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at
237, 326 N.E.2d at 791, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 218. The Felder court reasoned that "the right to
... counsel is an essential ingredient in our system of criminal jurisprudence" and is so
basic to the notion of a fair trial that its denial could never be considered a harmless error.
47 N.Y.2d at 295-96, 391 N.E.2d at 1278, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 299. Therefore, when a defendant
is "represented by a layman masquerading as an attorney but in fact not licensed to practice
law," Felder mandates that the conviction be vacated regardless of whether the defendant
was "individually prejudiced by such representation." Id. at 291, 391 N.E.2d at 1275, 418
N.Y.S.2d at 296.
7 140 Misc. 2d 136, 530 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1988).
See id. at 140-41, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
Id. at 136-37, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
10 See id. at 137, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 473. The defendant became aware of Steinberg's in-
volvements through an article written by columnist Jimmy Breslin for the New York Daily
News. Id.
11 See id. The defendant's motion was made pursuant to CPL § 440.10 (McKinney
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Subsequently, in anticipation of a ruling by the Appellate Division,
First Department, as to whether Steinberg had been properly ad-
mitted to the bar of New York,12 the motion to vacate was with-
drawn without prejudice.13 The Appellate Division subsequently
found that Steinberg had withheld material information when he
applied for admission and for the Court of Appeals' bar examina-
tion waiver.14 Consequently, the court revoked his license to prac-
tice law in New York, ordering that the revocation take effect im-
mediately.' 5 The defendant thereafter reinstated his motion to
vacate and it was granted.' 6
In granting the motion to vacate the conviction, Justice Fried-
mann, relying solely on the Appellate Division's order revoking
Steinberg's license to practice law, stated that Steinberg's disbar-
ment had retroactive effect and, therefore, the defendant was de-
nied his federal and state constitutional rights to the assistance of
"licensed" counsel at his plea and sentence.17 Applying the per se
1983). Id. After receiving the defendant's motion, the court appointed an attorney from the
18-B Panel of the Eleventh Judicial District to represent the defendant in the motion be-
cause it anticipated possible additional criminal liability. See id.
2 See In re Steinberg, 137 App. Div. 2d 110, 528 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1st Dep't), appeal
denied, 72 N.Y.2d 807, 529 N.E.2d 424, 533 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1988).
" Williams, 140 Misc. 2d at 137, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
" See Steinberg, 137 App. Div. 2d at 115, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 379. Under the Rules of the
Court of Appeals in existence at the time Steinberg applied for admission to the bar, an
applicant could have the bar examination waived if he or she met certain requirements. Id.
at 111, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 376. The court found that Steinberg failed to satisfy two of the
criteria: "his law school studies were not 'interrupted by active service in the armed forces'"
because he had been suspended from school for "poor scholarship" eleven months before he
entered the Air Force, and he did not have the required two-thirds of his academic credits
completed at the time he left law school. Id. at 112, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 376-77 (quoting then-
existing Rules of Court of Appeals).
15 Id. at 117, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 379. The Appellate Division revoked Steinberg's license
pursuant to Judiciary Law section 90(2). See id. at 111, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 376. That section
provides: "[Tihe appellate division of the supreme court is hereby authorized to revoke [the
admission to practice of an attorney] for any misrepresentation or suppression of any infor-
mation in connection with the application for admission to practice." N.Y. JUD. LAw § 90(2)
(McKinney 1980). The Steinberg court found that Steinberg's suppression of "material in-
formation as to his lack of qualifications for invocation of the Court of Appeals' waiver rule"
warranted revocation of his license without a hearing despite the fact that he had been
admitted into practice for seventeen years. Steinberg, 137 App. Div. 2d at 115, 528 N.Y.S.2d
at 378. The court conceded that the measure was drastic, but felt it was necessary in order
to maintain "a high standard of honesty" among future applicants. Id. Consequently, Stein-
berg's license was revoked and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys, "effective
immediately." Id. at 117, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
" See Williams, 140 Misc. 2d at 140-41, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 475-76.
'7 See id. Judge Friedmann rejected, for lack of evidence, Williams' contention that he
was denied "effective" assistance due to both Steinberg's alleged cocaine dependency and
1988]
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rule set forth in People v. Felder,18 Justice Friedmann reasoned
that because the defendant had not been represented by a "li-
censed" attorney, he was obliged to vacate the conviction regard-
less of whether Williams had been prejudiced by Steinberg's
representation. 19
It is submitted that the Williams court's failure to distinguish
between representation by an "unlicensed layman," the factual
predicate for Felder, and representation by an attorney whose li-
cense is subsequently revoked, led it to apply the rule of Felder in
an inappropriate factual context.20 Furthermore, it is submitted
that the Williams court misconstrued the effect of the decision re-
voking Steinberg's license.2'
In Felder, the Court of Appeals specifically limited its holding
to the facts presented-legal representation by an unlicensed
layperson never admitted to practice law in New York or any other
jurisdiction.2 The court, in a footnote, specifically excluded from
its holding representation by disbarred attorneys or attorneys li-
censed to practice in other jurisdictions but not in New York,23
and did not address the effect of subsequent discipline of an attor-
ney. It is submitted that the Williams court should have addressed
the distinction between representation by a layperson who has
his "alleged attorney-client cocaine dealings." Id. at 140, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
18 47 N.Y.2d 287, 391 N.E.2d 1274, 418 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1979); see supra notes 5-6 and
accompanying text.
11 See Williams, 140 Misc. 2d at 139-41, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 475-76. The court treated
Steinberg's representation of Williams as constituting the absolute denial of "effective and
unimpaired counsel," necessitating application of the per se rule. See id. at 141, 530
N.Y.S.2d at 475-76; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing Felder per se
analysis).
20 The Williams court did not address any perceived distinction between an attorney
never admitted to practice and one whose admission is subsequently revoked; it merely as-
sumed the two situations were identical.
21 See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
22 See Felder, 47 N.Y.2d at 294 n.6, 391 N.E.2d at 1277 n.6, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 298 n.6.
Both state court decisions relied on by Felder applied to representation by laypersons. See
People v. Cox, 12 Ill. 2d 265, 272, 146 N.E.2d 19, 23 (1957); Higgins v. Parker, 354 Mo. 888,
888, 191 S.W.2d 668, 669 (1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 801 (1946).
In Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1983), the Second Circuit, in vacating a
defendant's conviction, explicitly limited its holding to the facts it addressed-representa-
tion by a person who, unknown to the defendant, was not authorized to practice law in any
state because authorization was not sought or was denied on the basis of legal ability. See
id. at 167.
23 See Felder, 47 N.Y.2d at 294 n.6, 391 N.E.2d at 1277 n.6, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 298 n.6.
The Felder court did not decide whether such representation violates the state and/or fed-
eral constitutions. Id.
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never been admitted to practice law and representation by an at-
torney whose license is subsequently revoked. If, as Felder stated,
"counsel" means an attorney admitted to practice, it appears that
an attorney whose license is revoked after the challenged convic-
tion satisfies this definition since he or she is an attorney admitted
to practice at the time of the representation.24
Without discussing or citing any authority, the Williams court
decided that the revocation rendered Steinberg unlicensed retroac-
tively, stating that the "retroactive effect" of the revocation of
Steinberg's license provided a sufficient basis for its holding.25
24 Cf. N.Y. Jun. LAW § 486 (McKinney 1983). Section 486 provides:
Any person whose admission to practice as an attorney and counselor-at-law has
been revoked .... who does any act forbidden by the provisions of this article to
be done by any person not regularly admitted to practice law in the courts of
record of this state... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. The language of section 486 does not appear to apply to representation prior to the
revocation. See id. Under Judiciary Law sections 474 and 484, it is unlawful for any natural
person to practice or appear as an attorney for a person without first being admitted into
practice. See N.Y. JuD. LAW §§ 478, 484 (McKinney Supp. 1989). A person who violates
either of these sections is guilty of a misdemeanor. N.Y. Jun. LAW § 485 (McKinney 1983);
see Dacey v. New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, 290 F. Supp. 835, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd,
423 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970); In re Friedman, 126 Misc. 2d
344, 345, 482 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (1984).
Bar disciplinary proceedings revoking attorneys' licenses in this state are few in number
and none address the effects of the revocation with regard to prior representation of crimi-
nal defendants. See, e.g., In re Mishkoff, 135 App. Div. 2d 57, 58, 524 N.Y.S.2d 218, 219 (2d
Dep't 1988) (attorney's admission to practice was revoked for misrepresenting on bar appli-
cation that he received degree from certain school); In re Braunstone, 265 App. Div. 337,
338, 38 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (1st Dep't 1942) (suppression of information on application for
admission regarding fraud suit against him was sufficient to warrant revocation); In re
Moshkow, 250 App. Div. 780, 791, 294 N.Y.S. 474, 475 (2d Dep't 1937) (attorney's failure to
advise committee on character and fitness of "certain shortcomings" sufficient to warrant
revocation). Some courts have held that representation by a disbarred or suspended attor-
ney does not necessarily deprive the defendant of effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g.,
Waterhouse v. Rodriguez, 848 F.2d 375, 383 (2d Cir. 1988) (refusing to apply per se rule to
defendant's claim that he was denied right to counsel because he was represented by dis-
barred attorney); United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 698 (9th Cir.) (application of per se
rule rejected where defendants represented by disbarred or suspended attorneys), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986); White v. State, 464 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(rejecting application of per se rule to representation by attorney whose license was sus-
pended); see also Commonwealth v. Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 228, 402 N.E.2d 1329, 1336
(1980) (presence at counsel table of disbarred attorney who gave advice in the defense did
not deny defendant effective assistance of counsel where disbarred attorney's presence did
not have measurable impact and licensed attorneys represented defendant).
25 See Williams, 140 Misc. 2d at 140-41, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 475. The court stated: "The
disbarment of Mr. Steinberg as an attorney with retroactive effect by the Appellate Division
... furnished sufficient grounds to vacate defendant's judgment of conviction before this
court." Id.
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However, nothing in the Appellate Division's decision revoking the
license compels that conclusion.2" It is submitted that the Wil-
liams court's mechanical application of the Felder per se rule to
facts different from those to which the rule was meant to apply led
it to unnecessarily and unwisely extend the scope of the rule.
Vacating a conviction years after it is rendered has far-reach-
ing consequences. Prosecutors are faced with the choice of dis-
missing the charges against a defendant, or retrying him, a difficult
task if witnesses are unavailable or have suffered memory lapses.2
Because application of the Felder rule was intended to be limited
to narrowly-defined factual settings, in cases outside its narrow
scope the more prudent approach would be to abandon the per se
rule, and instead analyze the effectiveness of counsel's representa-
tion on a case by case basis.
Claudia A. Farella
New York County Supreme Court expands the continuous rela-
tionship doctrine to toll the statute of limitations
The statute of limitations' protects persons who are called to
26 See In re Steinberg, 137 App. Div. 2d 110, 528 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1st Dep't), appeal
denied, 72 N.Y.2d 807, 529 N.E.2d 424, 533 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1988). The Appellate Division did
not at any point in its decision state that its findings or its order to revoke Steinberg's
license rendered Steinberg "unlicensed" throughout the seventeen years he had been admit-
ted to practice law. Id. Moreover, there is no indication or support in the Appellate Divi-
sion's decision for the Williams court's cbnclusion that the revocation applied retroactively.
Id.; see also Mishkoff, 135 App. Div. 2d at 58, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 219 (court revoked attorney's
license but did not state that revocation rendered him unlicensed retroactively).
2 See Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 1983). The Solina court ac-
knowledged the severity of the consequences of a per se rule, stating that "[i]t may well be
impracticable for the Government to retry Solina 13 years after the event." Id.
1 See CPLR art. 2 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989). CPLR 201 provides: "An action...
must be commenced within the time specified in this article unless a different time is pre-
scribed by law or a shorter time is prescribed by written agreement. No court shall extend
the time limited by law for the commencement of an action." CPLR 201 (McKinney 1972).
Courts, however, may extend the time limitation for performing certain procedural require-
ments, see id. 2004, and a defendant's actions may be deemed by the court to estop him or
her from pleading the defense. See, e.g., Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 448-50, 377
N.E.2d 713, 716-17, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 262-63 (1978) (plaintiff relieved of time bar where
physician's intentional concealment of malpractice delayed commencement of action). The
